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INTRODUCTION

A post-employment non-compete covenant is an agreement by an
employee that, after termination of employment he or she will not compete with his or her former employer-usually within a specified
geographic area and for a specified period of time. Such covenants
are standard parts of many employment contracts. I
Under the long standing common law of contracts, non-compete
covenants are generally suspect as restraints of trade. 2 Post-employment
non-compete covenants also bear a strong presumption of unfairness
because of the superior bargaining power almost invariably wielded
by the employer. 3 Nevertheless most jurisdictions, including Texas, have
traditionally enforced post-employment non-compete covenants within
the constraints of the reasonableness test described below.
Recently, however, courts in several jurisdictions have begun to
view non-compete covenants with increasing disfavor. 4 Indeed, the opinions in two recent cases decided by the Supreme Court of Texas cast
serious doubt upon the continuing viability of such covenants in Texas. S
Unfortunately, both opinions are flawed in their reasoning and confused in their application of the law. Therefore, their predictive value
is unclear.
The purpose of this article is to (1) identify the policy issues and
conflicting interests; (2) describe the common law rules generally applied in most U.S. jurisdictions and examples of some statutory efforts to resolve the dilemma; (3) describe and critique the relevant Texas
law as it existed prior to the two most recent cases; and (4) discuss
these cases against the above-described background.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE DILEMMA; THE "SOLUTIONS"

A.

Policy Issues
The basic dilemma is the confrontation between· two interests so

at. Texas Southern University in Houston and a Visiting Professor at Loyola Law School in
.
Los Angeles.
1. Closius and Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement
of Employee Covenants Not to Compete, 57 So. CAL. REV. 531, 532 (1984) ..
2. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Sec. 186 (1979).
3. Id. at Sec. 188 comment g.
4. See, "Courts Skeptical of 'Non-Compete' Pacts", Wall Street Journal, Jan. II, 1989,
page BI.
.
5. Martin v. Credit Protecting Association, 31 TEXAS SUPREME COURT J. 626 (No. C-7339,
June 13, 1988) DeSantis v. Wackenhut, 31 TEXAS SUPREME COURT J. 616 (No. C-6617, June
13, 1988).
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widely acknowledged that they are often regarded as "rights": (1) an
employee's interest in having the freedom to accept employment in
his or her chosen field; and (2) an employer's interest in protecting
its business by agreeing with an employee that the latter will not compete with the employer for a stated time, within a specified geographic
area, after employment ceases. 6 Ironically, each of these interests might
generally' be thought protected by "freedom of contract."
1. Individual Rights

"Freedom of contract", while clearly a relevant notion, is perfectly
ambiguous in this context. The slogan alone will not resolve the dilemma
presented by the contradiction between sanctity of contract (pacta sunt
servanda) and freedom to contract (e.g., for the sale of one's personal
services). Indeed, freedom of contract is almost certainly a misnomer
if what is meant is that parties should be free to agree to whatever
terms they like and the state, through its judicial apparatus, should
enforce those agreements. In reality freedom of contract is neither so
simple nor so absolute.
Judicial refusal to enforce contracts involving fraud, duress or incapacity, for example, is at once an exception to and a prerequisite
of freedom of contract. 7 It is a prerequisite because freedom of contract is generally thought meaningful only when parties with contractual capacity act voluntarily.8 Even when these conditions are met,
however, the parties are not entirely free to do as they please, for the
doctrines of undue influence and unconscionability give courts broad
lattitude to adjust or avoid otherwise valid agreements. 9
The doctrine of unconscionability is most often invoked in situations said to involve unequal bargaining power. IO The real issue,
however, may be protection of the employee/covenantor from his or
her own willingness to enter an ill-advised and detrimental "bargain" .11
6. Kniffin. Employee Non-competition Covenants: The Perils of Performing Unique
Services. 10 RUT. CAM. L.J. 25 (1978).
7. Professor Duncan Kennedy describes this as "the constitutive character of the exceptions to enforcement." Kennedy. Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV.
563, 569-70 (1982).
8. [d.
9. [d.
10. [d. at 614; see also, Uniform Commercial Code Sec. 2-302 comment. "The principle
is one of the prevention of oppression ... " [d.
Il. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 634. "Courts using the doctrine of unconscionability like
to put their decisions on grounds of unequal bargaining power ... [b Jut its often obvious that
they are concerned not with power but with naivete." [d.
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The question is whether the prospective freedom to sell one's services
is an interest whose alienation the law should regulate or even forbid. 12 The idea that freedom to apply one's (legal) trade is an interest
"owned" by each individual is neither radical nor new. l l To conclude
that this interest should be inalienable, however, requires a second,
more difficult step. The unenforceability of a contract by which one
agrees to be murdered is scarcely controversial, but the analogy to an
agreement not to do a particular kind of work in a particular area
during a particular period of time seems altogether theoretical and attenuated. 14 There would be little basis for objection if, during the period
of the restraint, the covenantor was paid not to work, but this differs
from the typical situation only because in the typical situation the
covenantor is, arguably, paid in advance not to work during the period
of the restraint.

2. Economic Issues
The policy arguments against post-employment non-compete
covenants would seem especially persuasive when an employer has terminated an employee, or when an employer is using a post-employment
restriction to pressure an employee not to quit. With respect to the
latter situation, one court has observed that:
A covenant that serves primarily to bar an employee from working for others or for himself in the same competitive field so as
to discourage him from terminating his employment is a form of
industrial peonage without redeeming virtue in the American
economic order. I S

The court's reference to the "economic order" shifts the focus
12. See generally, Calebresi and Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability," 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972). There are three types of "entitlements": those protected
by property rules, those protected by liability rules, and those that are inalienable. "An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and
a willing seller." Id. at 1092-93.
13. J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (New York 1952) (6th Ed. London 1764)
"every man has a Property in his own Person . .. the Labour of his Body and the Work of
his hands ... are properly his." Id. at ch. V, sec. 27. J. Bentham, Theory of Legislation (R.
Hildreth trans. 1840) (1st ed. 1802). "The idea of property consists in an established expectation." Id.; Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. 405 U.S. 538 (1972). "[Tlhe dichotomy between
personal liberties and property rights in a false one ... In fact, a fundamental interdependence
exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right to property. Neither COUld.
have meaning without the other." Id. at 552. See generally, Radin, Property and Personhood
34 STANFORD L. REV. 957 (1982).
14. See generally, Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 12, at notes 45-51 and associated text.
15. Josten's Inc. v. Cuquet, 383 F. Supp. 295, 299 (E.D. Md. 1974).
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away from fairness to the individual, and toward a distinct policy issue.
This second issue is social utility and/or efficiency and the question
is whether society is better off with or without the enforcement of restrictive covenants in a given industry or business context. It can be argued,
in general, that the public interest is best served by enforcing at least
some post-employment non-compete covenants because they protect
and, therefore, encourage, employer investment and such investment
results in better products and services. 16
The social utility argument against enforcement is also largely
economic. The court in Reed Roberts Assocs. v. Shauman 17 described
the economic system's need for "the uninhibited flow of services, talent
and ideas"18 and went on to state that "no restrictions should fetter
an employee's right to apply to his own best advantage the skills and
knowledge acquired by . . . his previous employment." 19
The potentially significant collective economic impact of postemployment non-compete restraints has led some authors to advocate
application of the rules and principles of antitrust law. 20 The Sherman
Act proscribes "every contract in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states. "21 But this seemingly absolute prohibition has long
been tempered by the "rule of reason." 22 As a result, every postemployment restraint tested under the rule has survived. 23
16. See generally R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, Sec. 3.1, at 30 (2d ed. 1977);
Rubin & Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 96-97 .
(1981).
17. 353 N.E.2d 590 (1976).
18. Id. at 593.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Step-child: A Proposal for Dealing with
Restrictive Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1204 (1973); Sullivan,
Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust Treatment of Post-Employment Restraints of
Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621.
21. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1 (1976). The commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution has long been
construed as giving Congress significant power over not only interstate activities, but intrastate
labor-management relations. See e.g., U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117-24 (1941); N.L.R.B.
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,29-32 (1937). Also, although Sec. 6 of the Clayton
Act stipulates that human labor is not a commodity or article of commence, this definition was
developed to create room (within the antitrust arena) for labor unions to operate legally. Nichols
v. Spencer Int'l. Press, Inc. 371 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1967).
22. See Standard Oil Co. v. U.S. 221 U.S. 1,57-60 (1910), (acknowledging that every contract restrains trade and, therefore, the prohibition cannot be absolute).
23. See e.g., Bradford v. New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51,59 (2d Cir. 1974); Frackowiak
v. Framer Ins. Co. 411 F. Supp. 1309, 1318-19 (D. Kan. 1976); Alders v. A.F.A. Corp. of Fla.
353 F. Supp. 654, 656 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Miller v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. 339 F. Supp. 1296,
1297 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
At least one author has argued that the survival of the restrictions under antitrust analysis
results from the courts' failure to consider labor market impact, as opposed to product market
impact. Product market analysis is the traditional approach, but labor market analysis has been
employed in some sports cases. Note, The Antitrust Implications of Employee Non-compete
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In Newburger, Loeb & Co. v.' Gross,24 for example, the Court
of Appeals for the Secohd Circuit observed that:
employment agreements not to compete are proper subjects for
scrutiny under section i of the Sherman Act. When a company
interferes with free competition for orie ot its former employee's
services, the market's ability to achieve the most economicaIIy
efficient aIIocation of labor is impaired . . . ~estraints on postemployment competition that serve no legitimate purpose at the
time they are adopted would be per se invalid . . . Even if the clause
is riot overbroad per se, it might stili be scrutinized for
unreasonableness: Are the restrictions so burdensome that their anticompetitive purposes and effect outweighed their justifications?
Restraints that fail this balancing test might be struck down under
a rule of reason. 25

However, in concluding that the restriction at issue was reasonable and,
therefore, enforceable, the court cited the covenantee's "legitimate interest" in preventing the covenantor from competing for customers
of the covenantee. 26
B.

The Common Law Approach

Post-employment restrictive covenants, having their origins in an
era when apprenticeships approximated indentured servitude, were initially subject to extreme judicial disfavor. 27 A strong belief that such
Agreements: A Labor Market Analysis, 66 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1982), citing: Radovich v. N.F.L.
352 U.S. 445, 453-4 (1957); Mackey v. N.F.L. 543 F.2d 606, 616-18 (8th Cir. ,1975) cert. dismissed
434 U.S. SOl (1977).
24. 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977).
25. [d. at IOS2.
26. [d. Newburger, involving a securities brokerage firm, demonstrates the circularity of
embarking upon an antitrust analysis and ultimately testing the covenant against a standard not
appreciably different from the one that would have applied in the absence of the antitrust rhetoric.
See infra, notes 31-34 and associated text. Arguing that the economic issues remain relevant,
however, Professor Sullivan has suggested that "the courts should take into account market
impact in a more explicit and serious manner than they have so far." Sullivan, supra note 20
at 647. He advocates consideration of five factors in evaluating post-employment non-compete
covenants: (1) the totality of the anti-competitive restraints imposed by the employer involved;
(2) extent to which there is a pattern of such restraints in the relevant industry; (3) the state
of competition in the industry, and, more specifically, in the relevant geographic market; (4)
the scope of the restraint's prohibition and the remedy provided for violations; and (5) the nature
of the employee restrained, with special disfavor for restraints on employees who are particularly
valuable to competitors. Finally, Professor Sullivan suggests that courts subject proffered employer
justifications to a higher degree of scrutiny. [d. at 647-49.
27. The earliest recorded case concerning a post employment restrictive convenant was decided
in 1414. The case involved an agreement by a dyer to refrain from, practicing his. trade ·for a
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covenants constituted restraints of trade and were inherently repugnant to public policy dominated the first two centuries of English case
law on the topic. 28 In the 16th century, however, courts gradually
diminished the prohibition against such restraints, allowing enforcement if the covenant was reasonable with respect to duration, geographic
area, and benefit to the covenantee, and there was no violation of public
policy.29
The general common law rule today is that a post-employment
non-compete covenant is enforceable if it is supported by consideration and reasonable as to geographic scope, duration, ;'lnd range of
activities prohibited. 30 "Reasonableness" is determined against the
backdrop of an ostensibly independent determihation regarding the
legitimacy of the business interests for which the former employer Seeks
protection. 31
Many courts apply stricter standards to teSt the enforceability of
non-compete covenants associated with employment contracts as
distinguished from those for sales of businesses or dissolutions of
partnerships.32 hi a further effort to discourage employer attempts
obtain unjustifiably broad protection, some courts refuse to enforce
non-compete covenants that appear to have been drafted or included
in bad faith. 33

to

1.

Consideration for Employee's Covenimt
If a non-compete covenant is executed simultaneously with and

as part of an employment contract, the employment itself constitutes

period of six months after the termination of his employment by the covenantee. The court
judge refused to issue the injunction sought by the covenantee and was so incensed he declared
that, if the plaintiff had been present in court, he would imprison him until the plaintiff paid
a fine to the king. The Dyer's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5 f, pI. 26 (C.P. 1414).
28. Patterson, The Law of Contracts 'in Restraint of Trade at 34 (1891).
29. Id.
30. Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1979) provides, at Sec. 188(1), that a non-compete
covenant is unreasonable if
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee's legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee's need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor
and the likely injury to the public.
See e.g., Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 340 S.W.2d 950,951 (Tex. 1960); Hill v. Mobile
Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987). '
,
31. Id., See also, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, Section 188, comment d.
32. See e.g., American Hot Rod Assoc. v. Carrier 500 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1974), Accord.
C.O. Caster Co. v. Regan 357 N.E.2d 162 (Ill. 1976). The differentiated standard dates back
at least to Mitcheil v. Reynolds, 1 P.W.ms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). ,
33. E. Farnsworth, Contracts, Sec. 5.8, at 363.
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consideration for the covenant. 34 In most jurisdictions mere continuation of employment does not constitute consideration for a covenant
entered into after inception of employment. 3S In these jurisdictions there
must be new consideration through the provision of additional benefits
(e.g., a promotion, a salary increase, or an annuity) to the employee. 36
Texas has been among the minority of jurisdictions following the
alternate view that continued employment is sufficient consideration
for the enforcement of a post-employment non-compete covenant. In
McAnnally v. Person 37 a Texas court ruled that although the employee
had worked three months before execution of the' covenant, the covenant was supported by consideration. 38 More recently, in Martin v.
Credit Protection Association,39 the Supreme Court of Texas did not
dispute the finding of the trial court and the court of appeals that
continued employment constituted consideration for Martin's covenant. 40
2.

Reasonableness

It is generally held that in order to be enforceable, a non-compete
covenant should be limited to a reasonable period of time. 41 Some courts
have further specified that the duration must be limited to the period
during which the covenantee remains in business. 42
A host of subsidiary issues attend the basic requirement of
geographic reasonableness. For example, Texas courts, among others,
have held that where an express territorial restriction is unreasonably
broad in scope, it can be modified by limiting the restriction to the
area in which the former employee performed duties for his or her
former employer. 43 A prohibition without express geographic boundaries can be similarly limited to the territory where the former employee

34. Annotation, Sufficiency of Consideration For Employee's Covenant Not To Compete,
Entered into after Inception of Employment, 51 A.L.R.3d 825, 828 (1973).
35. Id. at 830.
36.Id.
37. 57 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
38. Id. at 948.
39. Supra note 5.
40. Id. at 626.
41. See e.g., Bob Pagan Ford, Inc. v. Smith, 638 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Schmidt
v. Central, 13 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1939); Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1973).
42. See e.g., Campbell v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 817 F.2d
499 (9th Cir. 1987).
43. See Eubank v. Puritan Chemical Co., 353 S.W.2d 90 error ref. nre (Tex. Civ. App.
1962); Plating, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 201 N.E.2d 239 (Ill. 1965); All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 308
N.E.2d 481 (Mass); Martin v. Kiddie Sales and Services 496 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
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carried out his or her duties for her employer, 44 or to the former
employer's business area,4S or to the former employer's customers. 46
The third element of the reasonableness test requires an examination of the range of activities the covenant purports to ban.47 In light
of the strong public policy opposing restraints of trade, the basic rule
is that a narrower ban is more likely to be held enforceable than a
broader one. 48 A covenant purporting to ban a former employee's pursuit of an entire occupation, even within a limited geographical area,
is most objectionable. 49

3.

Employer's Business Interest

The generally prevailing reasonableness test also provides that postemployment restrictive covenants are enforceable only if and to the
extent that they seek to protect a legitimate business interest of the
former employer. so Traditionally, such interests comprised only proprietary)nformation, notably, trade secrets and customer lists. S I This
requirement is sometimes ignored, however, by courts that seem to
enforce restrictive covenants on the most rudimentary of contract law
principles, i.e., that the covenant is part of a bargained-for-exchange. S2
Alternatively, courts have relied increasingly upon "uniqueness of
employee services" as a legitimate and, therefore, protectable interest
of the employer. S3 Purchasing Assocs. Inc. v. Weitz S4 illustrates the
44. See Wrentham Co. v. Cann, 189 N.E.2d 559 (Mass. 1963); McAnally v. Person, 57
S.W.2d 945 error ref. (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
45. See Brannen v. Bouley, 172 N.E. 104 (1930); New England Tree Expert Co. v. Russell,
28 N.E.2d 997 (Mass. 1940); Grace v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 255 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1953),
error ref. nre; and Thames v. Rotary Engineering Co., 315 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
46. See Edgecomb v. Edmunston, 153 N.E. 99 (Mass. 1926); Martin v. Kiddie Sales and
Service, 296 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); and Career Placement of White Plains, Inc.
v. Vaus, 77 Misc. 2d 788, 354 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1974).
47. See Whiting Milk Co. v. O'Connell, 179 N.E. 169 (Mass. 1931).
48. See e.g., Barnes Group, Inc. v. Harper, 653 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1981); Pemco
Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885, 891 (W. Va. 1979); Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751, 754
(1971).
49. See generally, Closius and Schaffer, supra note 1.
50. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 653 (1960).
51. See Id.; 6A Corbin, Corbin on Contracts Sec. 1394, at 100 n.83 (1962); Meeker v.
Stuart, 188 F. Supp. 272, 275 (D.D.C. 1960). Some authors have gone further and argued that
"only trade secrets or confidential information constitute a protectable interest sufficient to justify
any form of post associational restraint". Closius and Schaffer, supra, note 1 at 551.
52. See e.g., Foster & Co. v. Snodgrass, 330 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. SUpp. 838, 844 (D. Conn. 1976).
53. Kniffin, supra note 6 at 26; Tannenbaum, Enforcement of Personal Services Contract
in the Entertainment Industry at 21.
54. 196 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1963).
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emergence of the "uniqueness of employee services" standard as an
independent basis for enforcement of a post-employment restrictive covenant, rather than merely an additional factor to be considered while
seeking to protect trade secrets and customer lists. l5 The Purchasing
Assocs. court enunciated a standard, explaining that jt is not enough
to show that the individual excels at his work or that his .or her services are of great value to the employer. S6 . "[T]here must be a finding
that his services are of such character as to make [the employee's]
replacement impossible or that the loss of [the employee's] services
would cause the employer irreparable injury."s7
Other jurisdictions, including Texas, generally claim to follow this
standard. S8 Unfortunately, the standard has at least two problems. First,
it is not clear, in practice, whether the employee's services must be
truly unique or just very important. S9 Secondly, and more importantly, even if the services are unique, "there is no significant correlation
between uniqueness of the employee's services and the reasonableness
of restraining him from accepting employment with another
employer. "60 The former employee's skills and abilities, even if
developed and/or enhanced while working for the former employer,
belong to the employee and should not, therefore, constitute a legitimate
basis for the restraint. 6 I Moreover, even if the employee's departure
causes irreparable harm to the former employer, enforcement of the
negative covenant will not make the covenantee whole, but only punish
the covenantor. Punishment is not generally considered a proper ob55. Id. at 248.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 250.
58. Annotation, Enforceability of Covenant Not To Compete Involving Radio or Television Personality, 36 A.L.R.3d 1139 (1985).
59. The ambiguity of the standard is illustrated by the opinion in Bradford v. New York
Times Co., a suit contesting the enforceability of a post-employment restrictive covenant stipulating
the forfeiture of retirement benefits as liquidated damages. Bradford had worked for the Times
for 16 years, during which time he had served in capacities including General Manager, Vice
President, and Director. After leaving the Times, Bradford violated the covenant by going to
work for a competitor. The Times terminated his retirement benefits amounting to approximately
one half million dollars. Bradford sued. The United States Court of Appeals upheld the restrictive covenant on the basis of Bradford's "uniqueness", which it found to be inherent in his
"broad and vital corporate responsibilities" and his having been the "number two man" at
the Times. The court's position has intuitive appeal, but probably only because we assume he
"number two man" must have had virtually unfettered access to proprietary information (e.g.,
trade secrets and customer lists). If the court is protecting proprietary information, it does not
need the uniqueness standard. If it is protecting something else, that should be made clear. 501
F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1974).
60. Kniffin, supra note 6; at 27.
61. C. Kaufman, Corbin on Contracts Sec. 13918 (Supp. 1982); Hallmark Personnel of
Texas v. Franks, 562 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Club Aluminum Co. v. Young,
160 N.E. 804, 806 (Mass. 1928).
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jective of contract law, even in the event of breach. 62 A fortiori, it
is an improper objective when there has been no breach but only a
termination of employment pursuant to the terms of the contract.

C.

Statutory Solutions

Legislatures in several jurisdictions have statutorily addressed the
enforceability of post-employment non-compete covenants. 63 The
resulting legislation falls generally into two categories: prohibition and
limitation. An example of each approach is discussed briefly below.

1.

Prohibition

California courts have not adhered to the reasonableness test since
1872. 64 The California legislature enacted a statute which provides that
"every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful
profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void. "65

62. E. Farnsworth, supra note 34, sec. 12.8 at 842.
63. ALA. CODE Sec. 8·1-1 (1984 Rep!.); ALASKA STAT. Sec. 45.50.562, 45.50.574 (1986);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Sec. 44-1401 (1967 & Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. Sec. 8-2-113(2) (1986
Rep!.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 35-26 (1981 rev.); FLA. STAT. ANN. Sec. 542.33 (West Supp.
1987); GA. CODE ANN. Sec. 13-8-2 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. Sec. 480-4(c) (1976 Rep!.); IDAHO
CODE Sec. 48-101 (1977); IND. CODE ANN. Sec. 24-1-1-1 (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN.
Sec. 553-4 (West Supp. 1986); !UN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 50-112 (1983); LA. REV. STAT. Sec. 23:921
(West 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, Sec. 4 (West 1984); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN.
Sec. 445-772 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.Sec. 3250.51 (West 1981); MISS. CODE ANN.
Sec. 75-21-1 (1972»; Mo. ANN. STAT. Sec. 416.031 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. Sec. 28-2-703
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. Sec. 59-801 (Reissue 1984); N.J. REV. STAT. Sec. 56:9-3 (Supp. 1986);
N.M. STAT. ANN. Sec. 57-1-1 (Supp. 1985); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW Sec. 340 (McKinney 1968
& Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. Sec. 75·4 (Rep!. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE Sec. 9-08"06 (1975
Rep!.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Sec. 1331.06 (Anderson 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 Sec.
217 (West 1966); S.C. CODE ANN. Sec. 39-3-10 (Law Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
Sec. 53-9-11 (Supp. 1986); TENJoI. CODE ANN. Sec. 47-25-101 (1984 Rep!.); VA. CODE ANN. Sec.
591-9.5 (1982 Rep!.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. Sec. 19.86.030 (1978); W. VA. CODE Sec. 47-18-3
(1986 Rep!.); WIS. STAT. ANN. Sec. 133.03 (West Supp. 1986).
64. See Bosley Med. Group v. Abramson, 207 CAL. RPTR. 477, 480 (1984).
65. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE Sec. 16600 (West 1987). Former California Civil Code Section 1673 was the predecessor to the present Section. It was adopted in 1872 following the introduction, by Senator Pendegrast of Napa County, of Senate Bill 430 entitled "An Act to Establish
a Civil Code." The Measure passed the Senate on March 15, 1872, and the Assembly on March
16, 1872. A review of the 1871.annotations indicates that Sec. 1673 was taken verbatim from
Sec. 833 of the 1865 draft of a Civil Code for the State of New York. The New York Civil
Code was primarily a codification of prior common law. See, The Journal of The Senate, 19th
Session: Legislature ~f the State of California (1871-72) at 575; Revised Laws of the State of
California; in four codes, Political, Civil, Civil Procedure and Penal, at 329-30. Compare, The
Civil Code of the State of New York by the Commissioners of the Code (1865) at 255-56.
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The statute's applicability to personal services contracts is settled. 66
If a post-employment non-compete covenant only prohibits the
former employee from revealing trade secrets or confidential information such as customer lists, California courts will generally enforce the
covenant. 67 However, if a post-employment covenant has territorial
and/ or durational restrictions, it is generally unenforceable. 68 The rationale behind the courts' rulings is that non-compete covenants are
repugnant to California's public policy. 69
Statutory exceptions exempt sales of businesses 70 and dissolutions
of partnerships 71 from the general prohibition. Post-employment noncompete clauses in employment contracts, however, are not covered
by these exceptions and hence, are void in California. 72 Trade secret,
customer lists and other proprietary information are protected by other
legal principles, including those of agency. 73

66. Frame v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 97 CAL. RPTR. 811 (1971); Buskuhl
v. Family Life Ins. Co. 76 CAL. RPTR. 602 (1969).
67. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 CAL. RPTR. 836, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268 (App. 6 Dist.
1985); Rigging Intern. Maintenance Co. v. Gwin, 180 CAL. RPTR. 451, 128 C.A.3d 594 (1982).
68. See Loew's Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, cert. denied, 71 S. Ct. 570, 340 U.S. 954;
see also KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 164 CAL. RPTR. 571, 104 C.A.3d 844 (1980).
69. See Fidelity Credit Assur. Co. of California v. Cosby, 265 P. 372, 90 C.A. 22; Frame,
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 97 CAL. RPTR. 811, 20 C.A.3d 668 (1971).
70. The specific language of the statutory exception provides: "Any person who sells the
good will of a business, or any shareholder of a corporation selling or otherwise disposing of
all his shares in said corporation, or any shareholder of a corporation which sells (a) all or
substantially all of its operating assets together with the goodwill of the corporation, (b) all
or substantially all of the operating assets of a division or a subsidiary of the corporation together
with the goodwill of such division or subsidiary, or (c) all of the share of any subsidiary, may
agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a specified county
or counties, city or cities, or a part thereof, in which the business so sold, or that of said corporation, division, or subsidiary has been carried on, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill or shares from him, carries on like business therein. For the purposes
of this section, subsidiary shall mean any corporation, a majority of whose voting shares are
owned by the selling corporation." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE Sec. 16601 (West 1987).
71. Id. The specific language provides: "Any partner may, upon or in anticipation of dissolution of the partnership, agree that he will not carryon a similar business within a specified
county or counties, city or cities, or a part thereof, where the partnership business has been
transacted, so long as any other member of the partnership, or any person deriving title to the
business or its goodwill from any such other member of the partnership, carries on a like business
therein." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE Sec. 16602 (West 1987).
72. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 CAL. RPTR. 836, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268 (App. 6 Dist.
1985); Campbell v. Bd. of Trustees of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 817 F.2d
499, 502 (9th Cir. 1987); But see Rigging Intern. Maintenance Co. v. Gwin, 180 CAL. RPTR.
451 (1982).
~
73. See Restatement (Second) of Agency. Sec. 396(a)-(d) (1957).
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Limitation

A Louisiana statute declares void any non-compete agreement which
the employer may "require or direct any employee to enter into.'''4
However, such a restriction may be enforceable if it does not exceed
two years, and "the employer incurs an expense in the training of the
employee or incurs an expense in the advertisement of the business .. ."75
Louisiana courts have made it clear that the expense must be substantial and the referenced advertisement must connect the employeecovenantor with the business. 76
III.

THE TEXAS TRADITION, MARTIN AND DESANTIS

Texas courts have generally followed the prevailing common law
approach as outlined above, and held specifically that a non-compete
covenant is (1) a restraint of trade and enforceable only if reasonable;77
(2) unreasonable "if it is greater than is required for the protection
of the person for whose benefit the restraint is imposed or imposes
undue hardship upon the person restricted;"78 (3) unenforceable unless
reasonable as to duration, geographic scope and range of activities prohibited;79 and (4) unenforceable if injurious to the public interest. 80
Reasonableness is a question of law for the court,81 and a Texas court
can modify a restriction to make it reasonable or, without formally
modifying the covenant, enforce it only to a reasonable extent. 82 In
addition, an employer/covenantee who seeks injunctive relief has the
burden of proving reasonableness. 83
Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbe1l84 is the root of contemporary Texas case law regarding post-employment non-compete
74. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Sec. 23:291 (West 1985).
75. Id.
76. See, Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hall, 237 F. Supp. 678, 681 (E.D. La. 1965) aff'd 347
F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1965).
77. Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960).
78. [d.; Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (1983).
79. Frankiewicz v. National Compo Assocs., 633 S.W.2d 505, 507 (1982).
80. Matlock v. Data Processing Sec., Inc., 618 S.W.2d at 329 (1981).
81. Henshaw V. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d at 418.
82. See, e.g., Matlock V. Data Processing Sec. Inc., 618 S.W.2d at 329; Justin Belt CO.
V. Yost, 502 S.W.2d at 685; Spinksv. Riebold, 310 S.W.2d 668, 69 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1958, writ ref'd).
83. Custom Drapery CO. V. Hardwick, 531 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.) 1975, no writ).
84. 340 S.W.2d 950 (1960).
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covenants. Weatherford was a suit to enforce non-compete covenants
. against three former employees of a company involved in manufacturing and selling oil field equipment. 85 Upon commencement of employment, each of the defendant employees (two salesmen and an office
worker) signed covenants not to compete with Weatherford for one
year after termination of employment. 86 Soon after termination of
employment, they violated these covenants by organizing a company
that competed with Weatherford. 87 Weatherford sought and was denied
an injunction and the court of appeals affirmed. 88
Weatherford appealed and the Supreme Court of Texas, in affirming the court of appeals, adopted the reasonableness test generally
described in Part II of this article. 89 Applying the test, the court found
that the absence of any territorial limitation in the covenant meant
enforcement would preclude covenantors from operating their new
business anywhere in the world. 90 The court found this result
unreasonable;91 and while modification might be appropriate when
equitable relief was sought, Weatherford's prayer for an injunction
had become moot and "an action for damages ... must stand or fall
on the contract as written. "92 Thus, the court refused to award
damages. 93
The court reaffirmed and clarified Weatherford 21 years later in
Matlock v. Data Processing Security, Inc. 94 Matlock involved efforts
by Data Processing Services, Inc. ("DPS") to prevent competition by
Matlock and two other former DPS employees who quit their jobs
with DPS, established another company, and began to compete with
DPS in violation of non-compete covenants signed by the employees.
The covenantors sought a declaratory judgment that the covenants were

85. Id. at 951.
86. Id. The covenant stated: "I hereby contract and agree that for a period of one year

from the date of the termination of my employment, for any reason, I will neither enter into
a business offering like merchandise to that offered by Weatherford Oil Tool Company, Inc.,
nor assist either directly or indirectly any competitor of Weatherford Oil Tool Company, Inc.,
or any other person, company or organization in offering like mechandise to that offered by
Weatherford Oil Tool Company, Inc., in any area where Weatherford Oil Tool Company, Inc.
may be operating or carrying on business during said one year period." Id.
87. Id.
88. 327 S.W.2d 76.
89. 340 S.W.2d 950, 951. Lacking Texas precedent, the .court cited the Restatement of
Contracts and A.L.R. Annotations.
90. Id. at 152.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 953.
93.Id.
94. 618 S.W.2d 327 (1981).
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void. 9S DPS sought and was granted a temporary injunction pending
trial on the merits, and Matlock appealed. 96
The Supreme Court of Texas upheld that portion of the injunction that prohibited covenantors' use or disclosure of trade secrets or
confidential business information of DPS,97 but found the prohibitions
regarding use of "know-how" and information pertaining to "prospective customers of DPS" too vague to be enforced. 98 The court also
found the covenants' geographic scope (the whole of the United States)
unreasonable because DPS. had no protectable interest that reached
throughout the U.S. 99 The court affirmed the temporary injunction
as modified, after citing Weatherford and restating the general proposition that:
A determination of the reasonableness of territorial restraints upon
non-competition .contracts requires a balance of the interests of
the employer, the employee, and the public while bei~g "mindful
of the basic policies of individual liberty, freedom of contract,
freedom of trade, protection of business, encouragement of competition and discouragement of monopoly." 100

The current formulation of the Texas rule was set forth in a 1987
case styled Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc. 101 A brief analysis of the
Hill case is necessary to a discussion of the Texas Supreme Court's
recent opinions in Martin and DeSantis.

A.

HILL

Hill involved a non-compete covenant included in a franchise agreement between Mobile Auto Trim, Inc. ("Mobile") as franchisor and
Joel Hill as franchisee. The essence of the agreement was that Hill
would pay approximately $42,000 and five percent of his gross revenue
from a mobile automobile trim and repair business in exchange for
the use of Mobile's name and good will and an equipped van provided

95. Id. at 328.

96.Id.
97. Id. at 329.
98.Id.
99. Id. DPS had done business with less than two percent of the potential U.S. Market.
Id. at 328.
100. Id. at 329, quoting, in part, from Fidelity Union Life Co. v. Protective Life Ins. Co.
356 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
101. 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987).
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by Mobile. 102 The lengthy and detailed non-compete covenant provided
that after termination of the franchise agreement, Hill would not compete with Mobile, directly or indirectly, for a period of three years. 103
The prohibition covered seven counties, including the two within which
Hill's franchise areas were located. 104 After approximately two and one
half years, Mobile terminated the agreement because of Hill's delinquency in the payment of his franchise fees. lOS Hill violated the noncompete covenant by soliciting a Mobile customer almost immediately. 106
Mobile sought and was granted a temporary injunction. ,07
On appeal to the state Supreme Court, Hill argued that the noncompete agreement was a restraint of trade and unreasonable. lOS The
court set forth a four part test for reasonableness, indicating that a
non-compete covenant is unenforceable in Texas unless it is:
(1) necessary for the protection of the promisee;

(2) reasonable as to time, territory and activity and not oprressive
to the promisor;
(3) not injurious to the community; and
(4) supported by consideration. 109

The court announced its conclusion that the Hill covenant was

102. Id. at 169.
103. Id. at 170. The provision read as follows:

Franchisee (Hill) agrees that upon termination of this Franchise Agreement, for
whatever reason, Franchisee shall not directly or indirectly, as an officer, director,
shareholder, proprietor, partner, consultant, employee or in any other individual
or representative capacity, engage, participate or become involved in any business
that is in competition in any manner whatsoever with the business of the Company
or its franchisees. Furthermore, it is understood between the parties that substantial goodwill will exist [sic) between the Company and the managers of the various
car dealerships serviced by the Company and the Company's franchisees. Because
said managers are transient and frequently change employment among car dealerships, Franchisee further agrees that upon termination of this Franchise Agreement, for whatever reason, Franchisee will not directly or indirectly in any manner
whatsoever, contact said managers (irrespective of the car dealerships that employ
them) regarding business in competition with the Company. This covenant shall
extend for a period of three (3) years following the termination of this Franchise
Agreement or any renewal hereof. Further, this covenant shall cover the following
geographic area during said period: The following Texas Counties: Dallas, Tarrant,
Ellis, Denton, Rockwall, Kaufman, and Collin.
104. Id. at 169.
105. Id. at 170.
106. Id.
107. 704 S.W.2d 384.
108. 725 S.W.2d at 169.
109. Id. at 170-71.
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"plagued by a lack of reasonableness," 110 then proceeded to identify
three general problems with the restraint. III

1.

Consideration

First, the court said, the covenant was not supported by consideration. 112 However, in attempting to support this conclusion with a discussion of training and trade secrets, 113 the court demonstrated its confusion regarding a simple point: the covenant was part of the franchise
agreement and supported by the same consideration that made the agreement enforceable. I 14
The court distinguished post-employment non-compete covenants
from non-compete covenants associated with sales of businesses, thereby
implying recognition that restrictive covenants in different business contexts might be subject to different analyses. I I S Next, however, the court
proceeded to analyze the Hill covenant as though it was part of a simple
employment agreement rather than a franchisor-franchisee relationship.1l6 This choice (or oversight) should have made the consideration
issue an easy one, as the law across U.S. jurisdictions is uniform on
this point: if a non-compete covenant is executed simultaneously with
and as part of an employment contract, the employment itself constitutes consideration for the covenant. I 17 Texas is in accord. I IS
Moreover, Texas is among a minority of jurisdictions that take a more
liberal view of the consideration requirement in the context of postemployment non-compete covenants. 119
Thus, the majority opinion in Hill seems clearly to reflect a
misunderstanding of the consideration requirement and how it is met.

110. Id. at 170.
Ill. It would appear, although the court did not state, that anyone of the problems cited
would have been fatal to the covenant.
112. 725 S.W.2d at 171.
'113. Id.
114. See supra note 35 and associated text.
115. 725 S.W.2d at 170.
116. See infra note 128 and associated text.
117. See supra note 35 and associated text.
118. See, e.g., Garcia v. Laredo Collections, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 97, 98-99 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1980, no writ).
119. When the execution of a covenant not to compete is contemporaneous with the acceptance of employment, the latter becomes the consideration for the covenant. A question has arisen,
however, whether an agreement not to compete executed after employment has commenced is
supported by consideration ... Texas courts have held that continued employment is sufficient
consideration for a covenant not to compete. Id.
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2. Employer's Interest
Secondly, the court said Mobile had no legitimate business interest
to protect. 120 In most jurisdictions, this requirement would be met readily
by Mobile's customer lists and Hill's contacts on behalf of Mobile,
i.e., by Mobile's goodwill. 121
In Texas, "goodwill" has been defined as "that value which inheres in fixed and favorable consideration of customers arising from
established and well conducted business."122 Traditionally,Texas courts
have had no difficulty attaching value to business goodwill. 123 One Texas
court held that a restrictive covenant was enforceable
where the good will of the employer's customers had attached to
the employee during the latter's employment and the employee thus
had acquired during his employment a special influence which gave
him an advantage over the employer in competition for the
customer's business. 124

Another concluded that
most courts recognize that an employer has a sufficient interest
in retaining his customers to support an employee's covenant
whenever the employee's relationship with customers is such that
there is a substantial risk that he may be able to divert all or part
of their business. 12s

And just four years prior to Hill, Texas law still provided that a
covenantee
had a right to protect himself from the possibility that [covenantor] would establish a rapport with the clients of the business and
upon termination take a segment of that clientele with him.126

In Hill, however, the Texas Supreme Court not only refused to
120. 725 S.W.2d at 171.
121. See supra note 51 and associated text.
122. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mercer, 58 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1933)
rev'd on other grounds, 90 S.W.2d 557 (1936).
123. "Such value is based necessarily upon prospective profits to result from voluntarily
continued patronage of the public." Id.
124. Kidde Sales & Service, Inc. v. Peairson, 493 S.W.2d 326, 329-30 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, no writ).
.
125. Hospital Consultants, Inc. v. Potyka, 531 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1975).
126. Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. 1983).
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recognize Mobile's protectable interest in such goodwill but, amazingly,
declared that the goodwill actually belonged to Hill.127 It is noteworthy
that the court did not limit this conclusion to situations involving franchise agreements, as opposed to employment. Indeed, the court appeared
to use the terms "employee" and "franchisee" interchangeably and
even melded them into one: "employee/franchisee" .128

3.

The "Common Calling" Issue

Third, and potentially most troublesome for the future, the court's
majority adopted a new rule, concluding that no restrictive covenant
should be enforced against anyone engaged in a "common calling."129
The court did not define "common calling,"130 but introduced the rule
in discussing the question whether the covenant was "oppressive to
the promissor." 131 The court concluded the enforcement of the covenant was oppressive to Hill, stating
[n]ot only has he lost his franchise and investment therein, he is
now prevented from using his previously acquired skills and talent
to support him and his family in the county of their residence. 132

If the Hill majority's "common calling" rule is a sub-issue in the
"oppression" part of the four-pronged test of enforceability, 133 the
Hill opinion signaled a significant policy shift away from recent Texas
cases upholding restrictive covenants even when convenantors would
clearly be required to seek work in a different field,l34 or in a different
area of the same field. 135
127. 725 S.W.2d at 171.
128. Id. at 171-72.
129. Id. at 172.
130. Neither did the Utah case to which the Texas court attributed the rule: Robbins v.
Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (1982), but a subsequent Texas case establishes that a hairdresser is
engaged in a common calling-even if designated "shop manager". Bergman v. Norris oj Houston,
734 S.W.2d 673, 674 (1987). Meanwhile, the Utah court seems to have backed away from the
"common calling" issue and returned to a reasonableness standard. See, e.g., System Concepts,
Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983). (post-employment non-compete covenant enforceable
against national sales manager of cable television equipment company where covenant was
reasonable in time and area and necessary to protect covenantee's good will).
131. See supra note 109 and associated text.
132. 725 S.W.2d at 172.
133. See supra note 109 and associated text.
134. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Wilson, 501 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973,
writ dism'd w.o.j.).
135. Electronic Data Systems v. Powell, 524 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975.
writ ref. 'd n.r.e.).

20

THURGOOD MARSHALL LA W REVIEW

[14: 1

Alternatively, the "common calling" test may be a part of the
inquiry into the employer's protectable interest. I.e., an employee
engaged in a common calling, perhaps definitionally, does not provide
unique services and, therefore, the employer/covenantee is necessarily
deprived of the "unique services" rationale for enforcement of the
covenant. 136 This seems to be the approach taken by the Supreme Court
of Utah, from which the Hill court borrowed the common calling rule. 137
Within two years of adopting the common calling rule, the Utah court
backed away from that formulation, reverting to the more common
(arguably inverse) statement of the proposition:
to justify enforcement of a restrictive covenant by injunctive relief
the employer must show not only goodwill, but that the services
rendered by the employee were special, unique or extra-ordinary. 138

This approach would be consistent with prior Texas case law. 139
Whatever the current position in Utah, it seems the Hill majority
left an important gap in the protection available to an
employer/covenantee. By flatly refusing to enforce post-employment
non-compete covenants against employees engaged in common callings, the Texas court left employers with no protection against "common calling" convenantors who would misuse customer listS.140 It is
against this extremely problematic doctrinal background that Martin
and DeSantis must be assessed. 142

136. See supra notes 53-62 and associated text.
137. See supra note 130.
138. System Concepts Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983). For the quoted proposition,
the Utah court cited Robbins v. Finlay 645 P.2d 623, 627-8 (Utah 1982) the case in which it
established the common calling rule. The words "common calling", however, are conspicuously
absent from the more recent opinion.
139. See supra note 58; Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, 515 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston
[14th Dist.) 1974, no writ).
140. The Utah court upheld the portion of the covenant that prohibited misuse of customer
leads, even as it established the common calling rule. 646 P .2d at 627. This point seems to have
escaped the Hill majority. Customer leads are not readily protectable by trade secrets law. Crouch
v. Swing Mach. Co., 468 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1971, no writ).
141. 725 S.W.2d at 172.
'
142. Justice Gonzalez's dissent comprises a thorough critique of the majority opinion in
Hill. Id. See also, White, " 'Common Callings' and the Enforcement of Post-employment
Covenants in Texas" 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 3,589-619 (1988); Note, "Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim,
Inc.: The Common Calling Standard," 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 2, 297-320 (1988).
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Martin

The Martin case involved a three year non-compete covenant signed
by an employee three years after the commencement of employment
with a collection agency, upon the condition that he would be terminated
if he did not sign the covenant. 143 Two years after signing the covenant, Martin quit his job at Credit Protection Association ("CPA"),
joined with others to organize a new business, and began competing
with CPA.144 This competition included solicitation of CPA customers
with whom Martin had dealt while employed at CPA. 145 CPA sought
an injunction and damages. 146
The trial court found that CPA's collection process comprised
neither trade secrets nor confidential information, and held, on that
basis, that CPA had not met its burden of showing a protectable
employer interest. 147 The trial court went on to hold, however, that
CPA had a protectable interest in a list of 1200 customers with whom
Martin had dealt on CPA's behalf and that CPA was entitled to limited
injunctive protection. 148
The court of appeals affirmed. 149 In finding the four-part Hill test
satisfied, 1'0 the court of appeals held that (1) Martin's "customer contact" was a legitimate interest of CPA, (2) that Martin was not
"oppressed" by the three year restriction, (3) the restraint was not injurious to the public and (4) the training and salary received by Martin
comprised consideration to make the covenant enforceable. 1'1 Additionally, the court of appeals concluded that Martin was not engaged
in a "common calling, such as a barber, but, to the contrary ... [was]
unique to all CPA customers."J52
The Texas Supreme Court, in a brief opinion, confirmed the continuing viability of the Hill test but did not comment on the manner
in which the court of appeals had applied the test in the Martin case. IB

143. Martin v. Credit Protection Assoc., 757 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App. 1988).
144. Id. at 26.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 26-7.
148. Id. at 27. The trial court also awarded plaintiff reasonable attorneys' fees, but denied
CPA's prayer for exemplary damages. Id.
149. Id. at 31.
150. See supra, note 91, and associated text.
151. Martin v. Credit Protection Assoc., supra, note 5 at 29.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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Instead, the Supreme Court rested its decision on the common calling
issue, stating that:
Martin was and is a salesman, a "common calling" occupation.
We will not restrain the right of any individual to engage in a common calling. 154

The Supreme Court therefore reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals, dissolved the injunction, and heid· the restrictive covenant

vold.1B

.

The court's brief opinion and terse conclusion with respect to the
pivotal issue shed little light on the obvious question: what is a "common calling" occupation in Texas? It would seem, however, that in
~ejecting the court of appeals' conclusion that Martin's was not a comm_on calling, the Supreme Court rejected the rationale upon which that
conclusion was based, i.e., that Miutin had become "unique to all CPA
customers." I S6
Employee "uniqueness", as a factor to be considered in enforcing non-compete covenants, is problematic. 1S7 It is clear, however, that
~he court of appeals' reliance on the "uniqueness" concept is misplaced.
Unique employee services may comprise a protect able employer interest
and may serve, by mutual exclusion, to define "common calling", but
the court of appeals broke new ground in using employee's uniqueness
to convenatee's customers as a basis for concluding that the employee
was not engaged in a common calling. The appeals court's concept
of uniqueness seems dangerously close to the truism that each of us
is unique. (i.e., one of a kind). Whatever "uniqueness" means in this
context, it must mean more than that no two people are exactly alike.
Otherwise, no one can be engaged in a common calling or, at most,
a common calling situation could arise only when multiple salespeople
were assigned to the same clients and! or territory-and the clients considered those sales people fungible. The state supreme court's opinion
arrested movement in this direction, but did nothing to define "common calling".

154. [d.
155. [d.
156. [d.

157. See supra, notes 59-62 and associated text.
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DeSantis

The opinion in Desantis is considerably more detailed than that
in Martin. In 1981, as a condition of the commencement his employment by the Wackenhut Corporation, DeSantis signed an agreement
that he would riot compete with Wackenhut, within a 40 county area,
for a period of two years following the termination of his employment. 1 58 The agreement provided that its interpretation and enforcement would be governed by Florida lawY9 In 1984, DeSantis resigned,
established a competing business and began soliciting customers, in~
eluding some Wackenhut customers with whom he had dealt while
employed by Wackenhut. 160
Wackenhut sought an injunction and monetary damages, alleging
breach of contract and tortious interference with contract and business
relations. 16i The idal court issued an injunction, after reducirig th~
geographic ar~a of the proscription from 40 counties to 13. 162 The court
of appeals affirrried and DeSantis appealed. 163

1.

Choice of Law

The Su:preme Court of Texas first considered the parties' choice
of Florida law. The court adopted the rule of Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, providing, inter alia, that (1) there
must be a reaspnable relationship between the parties and the state
whose law is chosen and (2) the law of that state must not be contrary
to any fundamental public policy of the forum state. 164 The court found
the "reasonable relationship" aspect of the test satisfied. 16s
Turning to the public policy question, the court cited several differences between the relevant laws of Texas and Florida. In Florida,
the court said, non-compete covenants are made enforceable by statute
and courts are not empowered to refuse enforcement even when the
covenant "would produce an unjust result in the form of an overly

158. DeSantis, supra note 5 at 617.
159. [d.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

[d.
[d.
[d.
732 S.W.2d 29.
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws (1971), Section 187.
165. DeSantis, supra note 5 at 618.
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burdensome effect upon the employee."166 Additionally, the Texas court
asserted, Florida courts relax their normal standards for granting injunctive relief by presuming irreparable injury in the context of noncompete covenants. 167 Finally, the Texas court found that Florida courts
"give no consideration to the type of work done by the employee.
Thus, Florida courts have enforced convenants not to compete against
hairstylists, telephone salespersons, and secretaries."168 The Texas court
found these considerations, taken together, sufficient to nullify the
partie's choice of Florida law on the grounds that Flordia law regarding non-compete covenants is "contrary to the fundamental Texas
public policy of promoting free movement of workers in the job
market." 169

2.

What is Reasonable?

Testing the DeSantis covenant under Texas law, the court first
determined that DeSantis, as an established professional in the security
field and an office manager handling millions of dollars in gross annual revenues for Wackenhut, was not engaged in a common calling. 170
The court then proceeded to apply the Hill test, finding that the covenant failed two of the test's four parts. First, the jury had failed to
find that Wackenhut would be irreparably harmed by DeSantis' competition. This failure, the Texas Supreme Court held, was "essentially
equivalent to a failure to find that the covenant was necessary to protect Wackenhut."171 This conclusion is unjustified, however, because
the jury did not need to find irreparable harm under Florida Law,
which presumes such harm.172
Secondly, the court held that the covenant was not supported by
consideration, since "DeSantis had more than fourteen years as an
established professional in the security business before he joined
Wackenhut" and there was "no evidence that DeSantis obtained any
special knowledge or training from Wackenhut."173
166. Id., citing Twenty Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller, 389 So.2d 1062, 1063 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) rev. den. 419 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 1982).
167. Id., citing Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
168. Id. citing, Tiffany Sands, Inc. v. Mezhibousky, 463 So.2d 349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Channell v. Applied Research, Inc. 472 So.2d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Rollins
Protective Services Co. v. Lammons, 472 So.2d 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
169. Id. at 620.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra, note 167 and associated text.
173. DeSantis, supra note 5 at 620.
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On this point the court is simply incorrect in its application of
the law. Consideration for an employee's non-compete covenant entered
into at the inception of employment is found in the employment itself,
i.e., in the compensation the employee is promised and paid.174 Although
jurisdictions differ on the question whether mere continuation of
employment is consideration for a covenant signed after an employee
has begun work,17S there is broad judicial consensus that a non-compete
covenant included in an initial employment agreement (as was DeSantis')
is supported by the same consideration that makes the rest of the agreement enforceable, i.e., the promise of compensation.176 The issue
mislabeled "consideration" by the Texas Supreme Court should properly
have been considered in connection with the question of whether
Wackenhut, as covenantee, had a protectable interest (e.g., trade secrets
or customer lists) at stake. Here, the court has further compounded
the confusion evident in its discussion of the consideration issue in
the Hill case.
Nevertheless, on the basis of these two conclusions, the court found
the covenant unreasonable and, therefore, unenforceable. 177 The court
then turned its attention to DeSantis' counterclaims.

3.

Covenantor's Counterclaims

At the trial level, DeSantis and RDI (DeSantis' newly formed company) brought counterclaims for monetary damages, fraud and tortious interference with Contractual relations. 178 Before the Supreme
Court of Texas, they contested the denial of their damages claim, the
grant of summary judgment for Wackenhut on the tortious interference
claim, and the grant of a directed verdict for Wackenhut on the fraud
claim. 179
The claim for monetary damages was based on alternative theories:
(1) a common law cause of action based on wrongful issuance of an
injunction, and (2) a statutory claim that the covenant was an illegal
restraint of trade, violating the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust
Act. 180 The court held that because it had found the covenant unenforceable, DeSantis and RDI were entitled to damages. l8l RDI was
174. See supra, note 35.
175. See supra notes 36-37 and associated text.
176. [d.
177. [d.
178. DeSantis, supra.
179. [d.
180. TEXAS Bus. & COM. CODE Sec. 15.21(a)(I).
181. [d. at 621.
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awarded $18,000 actual damages as found by the jury, prejudgment
interest and costs, and reasonable attorney's fees. 182 DeSantis recovered
only attorney's fees and costs as the jury had found that he sustained
no actual damage. 183 Ominously, the court also stated that. although
there had been no showing of willfulness or flagrant misconduct by
Wackenhut, the presence of these elements would have made treble
damages appropriate. 184
IV.

CONCLUSION

While the Martin and DeSantis cases appear to cast serious doubt
upon the continuing viability of post-employment non-compete
covenants' in Texas, they are not clear and logical steps towards an
articulated policy objective. Instead, they compound and may tend to
institutionalize the confusion created by the majority opinion in Hill.
Thus, although the Supreme Court of Texas would appear to be at
the forefront of efforts to reign in restrictive covenants, recent Texas
case law provides inadequate footing for a successful attack on such
restraints.

182. [d.
183. [d.
184. [d.

